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I.

Introduction

Imagine finding yourself in litigation in a foreign country. Then,
imagine learning that, in the past, your opponent has routinely hired the
person who will be the “neutral” adjudicator in your case. Now imagine that
since the commencement of the litigation your opponent subsequently has
appointed the adjudicator to also be its party-appointed arbitrator in other
pending disputes arising out of the same incident that has given rise to your
dispute. And, imagine that neither the adjudicator nor your opponent
discloses the adjudicator’s appointments in the other pending disputes.
Would you feel like the adjudicator is going to treat your case fairly and
impartially?
Assuming the case does not involve a car accident caused by an
American tourist in a third world country that is being adjudicated in a
sham trial, do you think the judge would remove the “neutral” adjudicator if
you were to challenge the adjudicator for potential bias in favor of your
opponent? If you said “yes,” then you would be wrong in an English
arbitration proceeding pursuant to a “Bermuda Form” insurance policy.
This scenario is not a hypothetical situation. The material elements of
this scenario currently are unfolding in English courts for Halliburton
Company (Halliburton), a Fortune 100 company based in Houston with
approximately 55,000 employees and operations in about 70 countries.1
On April 20, 2010, when a deep-water oil well in the Gulf of Mexico
was in the process of being plugged and temporarily abandoned, the well
* Christopher C. French is a Professor of Practice at Penn State Law School; J.D., Harvard Law
School; B.A., Columbia University.
1. HALLIBURTON CO., 2017 ANNUAL REPORT, FORM 10-K 1 (2018).
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suffered a blowout.2 There was an explosion and a fire on the Deepwater
Horizon oil rig servicing the well.3 BP Exploration and Production Inc.
(BP) was the lessee of the rig.4 Transocean Holdings LLC (Transocean) was
the owner of the rig and had been engaged by BP to provide the crew and
drilling teams.5 Halliburton provided cementing and well-monitoring
services to BP in connection with the temporary abandonment of the well.6
Numerous claims were asserted against BP, Transocean, and
Halliburton by the U.S. Government, as well as corporate and individual
claimants in connection with the explosion and massive oil spill that
ensued.7 Many of the claims were consolidated into a single multidistrict
litigation in federal court in the Eastern District of Louisiana.8 Shortly
before a verdict was rendered in a trial regarding liability, Halliburton
settled for approximately $1.1 billion.9 Ultimately, when judgment was
rendered, Halliburton was only found 3% liable.10
Halliburton has substantial insurance to cover its liabilities. The policy
at issue in the English litigation is a Bermuda Form liability policy drafted
and issued by Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd. (Chubb) (formerly known as
ACE Limited) that provides $100 million of coverage.11 When
Halliburton’s $100 million claim was tendered for payment, Chubb denied
coverage, contending that Halliburton’s settlement was unreasonable and
entered without Chubb’s consent.12
Although the policy specified that New York law would govern the
resolution of any disputes, the policy called for arbitration in London with
three arbitrators—one appointed by each party and the third appointed by
the two chosen arbitrators. If the two chosen arbitrators could not agree
upon the third arbitrator, then the appointment was made by England’s
High Court.13 The two chosen arbitrators could not, in fact, agree on the
third arbitrator so the High Court appointed Arbitrator M, an arbitrator
requested by Chubb, as the chair of the arbitration panel.14
Chubb previously had appointed Arbitrator M as a party-appointed
arbitrator in numerous matters, and he was currently an arbitrator in two
2. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [4] (Eng.).
3. Id.
4. Id. at [5].
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at [7].
8. Id.
9. Id. at [8].
10. Id.
11. Id. at [6].
12. Id. at [9].
13. Id. at [6].
14. Id. at [10]. In order to maintain anonymity, the opinions refer to the arbitrator at issue as
“M” instead of by name.
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other pending arbitration proceedings in which Chubb was a party. Not
surprisingly, Halliburton objected to Arbitrator M’s appointment as the
“neutral” arbitrator.15
While the arbitration between Halliburton and Chubb was pending,
Arbitrator M accepted another appointment from Chubb as an arbitrator in a
separate arbitration proceeding with Transocean regarding the same
Deepwater Horizon incident.16 In that matter, Chubb contended, among
other things, that Transocean’s settlement of the underlying claims was
unreasonable and entered without Chubb’s consent.17
In addition, Arbitrator M subsequently accepted another appointment
as an arbitrator by another insurer during the pendency of the Halliburton
arbitration in yet another insurance arbitration involving Chubb and the
same Deepwater Horizon incident.18 Throughout this time, neither Chubb
nor Arbitrator M disclosed to Halliburton that Arbitrator M had accepted
insurer appointments as an arbitrator in the two other pending insurance
disputes involving the same Deepwater Horizon incident.19
When Halliburton learned of the other appointments, it requested that
Arbitrator M recuse himself because there was a perception that he might
not be impartial under the circumstances due to his failure to disclose his
involvement as an insurer-appointed arbitrator in these other disputes
involving Chubb and the same Deepwater Horizon incident. Arbitrator M
declined to do so unless Chubb agreed that he should.20 Chubb did not agree
that he should recuse himself, so Halliburton brought a lawsuit in the
English courts to remove Arbitrator M as the chair of the arbitration panel.21
On February 3, 2017, the High Court denied Halliburton’s request to
remove Arbitrator M, stating:
M is a well-known and highly respected international arbitrator. He
has extensive experience of insurance and reinsurance law, both
English and New York law. . . . He has sat as a member of an
arbitration tribunal in over thirty references concerning the Bermuda
Form over many years. He enjoys a reputation as an international
arbitrator of the highest quality and integrity.
...
[Halliburton’s request] seems to proceed from the false premise that
party appointed arbitrators cannot be expected to comply with their
own duties of impartiality and need the chairman to ensure that they

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at [10]–[19].
Id. at [13].
Id. at [9].
Id. at [15].
Id. at [13]–[15].
See id. at [16].
Id. at [19]–[20].
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do not exercise bias in favour of their appointees, a proposition
which is as offensive to the international arbitration community in
general, and to [the party-appointed arbitrators] in particular, as it is
erroneous.22
Halliburton appealed the High Court’s ruling to England’s Court of
Appeals.23
On March 1, 2017, while Halliburton’s appeal regarding the removal
of Arbitrator M was pending, the arbitration tribunals in the two other
disputes involving the Deepwater Horizon incident in which Arbitrator M
was an arbitrator entered judgment in favor of Chubb.24
On December 5, 2017, while Halliburton’s appeal regarding the
removal of Arbitrator M was still pending, the arbitration panel proceeded
to enter judgment in favor of Chubb in the Halliburton arbitration by a 2–1
vote with Arbitrator M and Chubb’s party-appointed arbitrator voting in
favor of Chubb.25 Halliburton could not appeal the arbitration panel’s
decision because the parties have no appellate rights under the Bermuda
Form policy drafted and issued by Chubb.26
On April 19, 2018, England’s Court of Appeals affirmed the High
Court’s ruling in favor of Chubb with respect to the removal of Arbitrator
M. The court reasoned that:
[Although] M ought as a matter of good practice and, in the
circumstances of this case, as a matter of law to have made
disclosure to Halliburton at the time of his appointments in [the other
related matters]. . . . M is a “well known and highly respected
international arbitrator” with very extensive experience as an
arbitrator. . . . [Thus,] we agree with the [High Court] judge’s overall
conclusion that the fair-minded and informed observer, having
considered the facts, would not conclude that there was a real
possibility that M was biased.27
In short, Chubb’s repeated party appointments of Arbitrator M and
Arbitrator M’s failure to disclose subsequent party appointments by Chubb
and another insurer in other pending arbitrations involving the same
Deepwater Horizon incident would not give a “fair-minded and informed
observer” reason to believe that there “was a real possibility that
[Arbitrator] M was biased.”28 So, even though the Court of Appeals
22. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [9], [30]
(Eng.).
23. See Halliburton Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817.
24. Id. at [23].
25. Id. at [24].
26. Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [5(4)].
27. Halliburton Co. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [94], [98], [100] (quoting Justice Popplewell
in Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC 137 (Comm)).
28. Id. at [100].
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concluded Arbitrator M should have disclosed the subsequent pending
appointments in the other arbitrations in which Chubb was involved, if he
had done so it would not have mattered. Halliburton still would not have
had a valid basis to object to Arbitrator M’s continued participation as the
“neutral” chair in Halliburton’s arbitration because Arbitrator M is a “well
known and highly respected international arbitrator”—i.e., it was a
remediless breach of duty by Arbitrator M.29
Central to the Court of Appeals’ analysis is the premise that
arbitrators, whether appointed by a party or otherwise, have:
[a] duty to act independently and impartially . . . owing no allegiance
to the party appointing them. Once appointed they are entirely
independent of their appointing party and bound to conduct and
decide the case fairly and impartially.30
In addition, the Court of Appeals assumed that the mere fact that an
arbitrator has accepted multiple appointments concerning the same or
overlapping subject matter for the same party and apparently has reached
results favorable enough to the party that the party repeatedly appoints him
“does not of itself give rise to an appearance of bias. . . . ‘Something more
is required’ and that must be ‘something of substance.’”31 That “something
more” was lacking in the Halliburton matter, in the Court of Appeals’
opinion.
The Court of Appeals was also not particularly troubled by the fact
that Arbitrator M might have been exposed to information and evidence in
Chubb’s other arbitration proceeding regarding the Deepwater Horizon
incident that could shape Arbitrator M’s view of Halliburton’s claim
without Halliburton being aware what that the evidence was or even given a
chance to respond to it.32 Although the Court of Appeals recognized this
was a “legitimate concern,” the court dismissed it, stating:
Arbitrators are assumed to be trustworthy and to understand that they
should approach every case with an open mind. The mere fact of
appointment and decision making in overlapping references does not
give rise to justifiable doubts as to the arbitrator’s impartiality.
Objectively this is not affected by the fact that there is a common
party. An arbitrator may be trusted to decide a case solely on the
evidence or other material before him in the reference in question
and that is equally so where there is a common party.33

29. Id. at [98] (quoting Prince Jefri Bolkiah v. State of Brunei Darussalam (No 3), [2007]
UKPC 62, [2008] 2LRC 196 at [18]).
30. Id. at [26] (quoting the Halliburton Co. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [19]).
31. Id. at [53] (quoting Dyson LJ in AMEC Capital Projects Ltd. v. Whitefriars City Estates
Ltd. [2005] 1 All ER 723, [20]).
32. Id. at [49]–[50].
33. Id. at [51].
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Halliburton has petitioned England’s Supreme Court to allow an
appeal. The Supreme Court has an opportunity to review the lower courts’
analysis and conclusion, but it remains to be seen whether the Supreme
Court will hear the case or what its decision will be if it does.
In the meantime, the case presents the questions of whether: 1) English
arbitrations under Bermuda Form policies provide a venue and dispute
resolution process in which American policyholders can feel confident that
justice will be served, and 2) England’s lower courts’ analysis and
conclusion would be affirmed under U.S. law. As things stand now, the
answer to both questions is “no.”
II.

Bermuda Form Policies and London Arbitrations in Contrast to
Judicial Proceedings in the United States

The Bermuda Form is an excess liability policy form that was created
by ACE Insurance Company Limited (ACE) in 1985.34 ACE was a
Bermuda-based insurance company that was created by Marsh &
McLennan, an insurance broker, and J.P. Morgan, a bank, in response to the
liability insurance crisis in the mid-1980s when the market for excess
liability insurance became very challenging due, among other reasons, to
the explosion of long-tail claims related to asbestos and environmental
contamination. Although it originally was sold just by ACE and XL
Insurance Limited (XL), another Bermuda-based insurance company, the
Bermuda Form is now sold by other insurers as well, and it is commonly
sold to corporate policyholders in the United States.35
The Bermuda Form was created by insurers to address their
dissatisfaction with U.S. courts’ interpretation of policy provisions
commonly found in existing liability policies. Specifically, insurers
perceived that the courts in many states were pro-policyholder. To address
that concern, New York law is specified as the controlling law under
Bermuda Form policies, and disputes are resolved in binding arbitration in
London (or less commonly, Bermuda).36 New York law is generally
perceived as the most favorable for insurers in the United States.
Nonetheless, the Bermuda Form also modifies New York law in the areas
where insurers view New York law as unfavorable to insurers, such as New
York’s rules regarding the interpretation of insurance policies. In addition,
there are no appellate rights regarding the arbitrators’ decisions under
Bermuda Form policies in order to ensure that U.S. courts will not have any
involvement in the resolution of the parties’ disputes.37
34. In 2016, ACE acquired Chubb, but ACE adopted Chubb’s name, so the surviving
company is named Chubb.
35. See RICHARD JACOBS, LORELIE S. MASTERS, & PAUL STANLEY, LIABILITY INSURANCE
IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE BERMUDA FORM 1, 10–12 (2d ed. 2011).
36. Id. at 127.
37. Id. at 6.
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Under the Bermuda Form, the arbitration is comprised of a threearbitrator panel with each party picking one of the arbitrators and the two
chosen arbitrators selecting the third arbitrator, who acts as the “neutral”
chair of the panel.38 Insurers typically select an English barrister or a retired
English judge as their party-appointed arbitrator so they will not be
influenced by the U.S. courts’ perceived bias in favor of policyholders.39 It
is not uncommon for both the insurer’s party-appointed arbitrator and the
“neutral” arbitrator to work in the same chambers because English barristers
are viewed as independent contractors even though they may work in the
same office.40
An English arbitration proceeding is an unfamiliar and exotic legal
process for most American companies. For example, although parties
exchange documents, written discovery such as interrogatories and requests
for admission is not conducted.41 Depositions are also not conducted, so the
first opportunity counsel has to question the opposing party’s witnesses is in
the arbitration proceeding itself.42 In addition, there are no live direct
examinations of witnesses.43 Direct examinations of witnesses are
“conducted” by way of written statements that are drafted by the attorneys,
solicitors, and/or barristers and then submitted to the arbitrators. The only
live examination of witnesses is on cross examination.44
English arbitrations differ from U.S. court litigation in a number of
other important aspects as well. One, arbitrators are chosen and paid by the
parties.45 Although English law provides that arbitrators should be
independent and impartial once appointed, if an arbitrator’s livelihood is
dependent upon receiving appointments and obtaining results satisfactory to
the party appointing the arbitrator, then it is a legal fiction to pretend that
party-appointed arbitrators are independent and neutral. Stated differently,
how likely is it that Chubb and other insurers would continue to appoint
Arbitrator M decade after decade if the results they were receiving in the
arbitrations with him were unfavorable? Indeed, why have party-appointed
arbitrators at all if they are truly independent and neutral? Why not simply

38. Id. at 591.
39. Id. at 273–74.
40. Id. at 279–80.
41. See id. at 310 (outlining the standard requirement for disclosure, which does not include
requests for admission); id. at 331 (stating powers available in English litigation, such as
discovery by interrogatory, are restricted in the arbitration setting); id. at 335 (noting that
arbitrators’ power to order “questions [to] be put to and answered by the respective parties” is
most commonly used for merely clarifying a party’s case, not to elicit information for use at the
hearing) (internal quotations omitted).
42. Id. at 284.
43. Id. at 285.
44. Id. at 284.
45. Arbitration Act 1996 c. 23, §§ 16, 28 (Eng.).
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have an arbitration organization, as opposed to the parties, appoint one or
more arbitrators if they are all neutral?
Two, English arbitrations are subject to very limited judicial control
and review. Although regular English arbitrations allow for judicial review
of rulings regarding English law, there are no appellate rights under
Bermuda Form policies, including the policy at issue in the Halliburton
case, with respect to the arbitrators’ decision.46 In a court proceeding, in
contrast, there are numerous checks and balances on the decision makers.
First, the parties are entitled to a jury trial with the jury comprised of people
who do not know the parties.47 Second, if a party is dissatisfied with the
jury’s verdict, then the party can ask the trial court to set aside the verdict or
grant a new trial.48 Third, the party can appeal both the trial court’s legal
rulings and the jury’s verdict.49
Three, English arbitration proceedings and the results thereof are
confidential. Thus, a repeat player in English arbitrations, such as Chubb, is
aware of the results obtained in past arbitrations including, for example,
which arbitrators ruled in its favor. Non-repeat players in arbitrations, such
as the typical American policyholder, do not know the results of the past
arbitrations. This creates a significant information asymmetry between
insurers and policyholders. Court proceedings, in contrast, are public. Thus,
both parties have equal access to judicial opinions and they are able to
research the proclivities and ideologies of the judges before whom they
appear.
Four, the standard for what constitutes potential bias or the potential
for the appearance of bias that would justify recusal appears to be quite
different in an English arbitration than in a typical U.S. court proceeding if
the High Court’s and Court of Appeals’ rulings are reflective of English law
and practice. As an initial matter, judges in the U.S. are not selected by the
parties to resolve their disputes so the judges’ livelihoods do no depend
upon the results they procure for the party appointing them.50 If a judge
were financially dependent upon one of the parties in a case, then it would
be unquestioned in the U.S. that the judge would need to recuse himself.
Indeed, if a judge has any involvement with any party, then the judge
should recuse himself.51 Similarly, if a juror even knows one of the parties
or attorneys in the case, then that juror typically is dismissed.

46. See Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Insurance Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [5]
(Eng.).
47. FED. R. CIV. P. 38; see FED. R. CIV. P. 47 (allowing parties to examine potential jurors
and excuse party-selected jurors for cause).
48. FED. R. CIV. P. 50.
49. Id.
50. See 28 U.S.C. § 137 (2016).
51. See id. § 455 (listing various reasons a judge should recuse himself).
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Under English law, an arbitrator is only removed if “circumstances
exist that give rise to justifiable doubts as to his impartiality . . . .”52 The test
under that language is “whether [a] fair-minded and informed observer,
having considered the facts, would conclude that there was a real possibility
that the tribunal was biased.”53 It is an objective test. On its face, this test
does not seem very different than U.S. law, and one would expect
Arbitrator M to be disqualified because he repeatedly has been appointed by
Chubb and he accepted appointments by Chubb and another insurer related
to the same underlying matter without disclosing them. Yet, repeated party
appointments by the same party, even in the same type of case, in itself
does not provide a basis for a reasonable apprehension of lack of
impartiality according to England’s Court of Appeals.54 “Something more is
required,” and it must be “something of substance.”55 It is unclear what
exactly the “something more” of “substance” must be if a history of
numerous appointments by the same party in disputes involving the same
policy language in exchange for money and then failing to disclose
contemporaneous appointments by an opposing party in connection with the
same underlying incident are not enough.
Finally, English arbitrations are as, if not more, expensive as litigating
in U.S. courts. In an English arbitration, the parties have to hire English
solicitors and barristers, as well as the three arbitrators, which means the
arbitration process is top heavy with English solicitors and barristers who
charge much higher rates than most U.S. attorneys. And, most American
policyholders typically also have U.S. attorneys working on the matters as
well. Then, the parties, witnesses, counsel, and arbitrators must travel to
and house themselves in London, one of the most expensive cities in the
world, for the duration of the arbitration proceeding. It is a very expensive
way to resolve disputes.
III. Why American Companies Historically Have Purchased Bermuda
Form Policies
Regardless of what England’s Supreme Court decides, why would an
American policyholder who wants a fair process in which to resolve
insurance coverage disputes buy a Bermuda Form policy to cover losses
that can total hundreds of millions of dollars and potentially bankrupt the
policyholder if the dispute resolution process under Bermuda Form policies
is decidedly slanted in favor of the insurer? There may be one or more
answers to that question depending upon the particular policyholder.

52. Arbitration Act 1996 c. 23, § 24(1)(a) (Eng.).
53. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2018] EWCA Civ. 817, [39] (Eng.).
54. Id. at [81]–[82] (noting it would be “absurd” if the remuneration a party-appointed
arbitrator receives for an appointment would be a basis for disqualification).
55. Id. at [53].
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One, there are some aspects of the Bermuda Form policy language that
actually favor policyholders. For example, the Bermuda Form expressly
covers claims for punitive damages.56 Few liability policies in the U.S.
expressly cover punitive damages, and many U.S. state courts have
concluded liability policies should not even be allowed to cover such claims
for public policy reasons.57
Two, ACE and XL, the primary sellers of Bermuda Form policies for
many years, were well-capitalized companies.58 Consequently,
policyholders could be confident that, if necessary, their insurers had the
financial resources to pay claims totaling hundreds of millions of dollars.
Three, many policyholders likely were not even cognizant of the onesided nature of the dispute resolution provisions of Bermuda Form policies
because they had not read the policies. Indeed, most policyholders do not
receive copies of insurance policies before they purchase them, and even if
they have copies of the policies, they have not read them or understood
them.59
Four, for many years the premium price and lack of alternatives made
Bermuda Form policies an attractive option. The Bermuda Form was first
created and sold when the liability insurance market was in crisis, and there
were skyrocketing premium prices for traditional excess liability insurance
with only limited availability.60 Bermuda Form policies were the best, if not
only, option for some policyholders.
Finally, policyholders historically could count on the appointment of
independent, neutral arbitrators in English arbitrations. If that were not the
case, then there would be a lengthy list of cases like Halliburton’s in which
the policyholder was challenging the appointment of the neutral arbitrator
in English courts. There is not. Prior to the Halliburton case, American
policyholders generally could expect that an unbiased person would be
appointed as the neutral arbitrator. If that is no longer the case, then it is

56. See JACOBS, MASTER, & STANLEY, supra note 35, at 44.
57. See, e.g., Northwestern Nat. Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432, 433, 441–43 (5th Cir.
1962) (explaining that the policy did not expressly cover or exclude coverage for punitive
damages and holding that it was against public policy for insurance to cover punitive damages
because allowing coverage would undermine the deterrent and punishing effects of a punitive
damages award); CHRISTOPHER C. FRENCH & ROBERT H. JERRY II, INSURANCE LAW AND
PRACTICE: CASES, MATERIALS, & EXERCISES 878 (2018) (“Courts are split on the question of
whether public policy allows punitive damages to be insured as a matter of public policy.”).
58. See, e.g., ACE, ACE LIMITED’S 2014 ANNUAL REPORT 3 (2014) (reporting the annual
income
for
2014
was
$3.3
billion),
http://www.annualreports.com/HostedData/
AnnualReportArchive/c/NYSE_CB_2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/VCV7-A4ZM].
59. See, e.g., Kenneth S. Abraham, Four Conceptions of Insurance, 161 U. PA. L. REV.
653, 660 (2013); Michelle E. Boardman, Contra Proferentem: The Allure of Ambiguous
Boilerplate, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1105, 1120 (2006); Robert E. Keeton, Insurance Law Rights at
Variance with Policy Provisions, 83 HARV. L. REV. 961, 968 (1970).
60. See JACOBS, MASTERS, & STANLEY, supra note 35, at 1, 10.
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unlikely that any of the first four reasons discussed in this Part of the Essay
would continue to justify the purchase of Bermuda Form policies.
IV. Viewing the English Courts’ Decisions through the Prism of the
United States Legal System
It is hard to predict what England’s Supreme Court will do in the
Halliburton case, but it is not hard to predict the outcome of the case under
U.S. law. For numerous reasons, the lower courts’ rulings would be
reversed, and Arbitrator M would be disqualified and removed.
First, although arbitrators, including party-appointed arbitrators, are
supposed to be independent and impartial under English law, it defies
reality or logic to believe that an arbitrator who is repeatedly appointed by a
party in exchange for money is impartial with respect to that party. Indeed,
if the results that Chubb received in past arbitrations in which Arbitrator M
was appointed were unfavorable, then Chubb would not repeatedly appoint
Arbitrator M. That fact alone should be enough to raise a reasonable and
justified appearance of impartiality by Arbitrator M.
Second, even if Arbitrator M is not consciously biased in favor of
Chubb despite repeated appointments by Chubb, there is, at a minimum, an
appearance of subconscious bias by Arbitrator M in favor of Chubb.61 If
Arbitrator M does not have at least a subconscious bias in favor of Chubb,
then is it just a coincidence that Arbitrator M consistently reaches decisions
that favor of Chubb, including all three of the Deepwater Horizon
arbitrations that recently were concluded?
Third, contrary to the High Court’s and the Court of Appeals’
observations, whether Arbitrator M is a well-respected international
arbitrator is irrelevant in the case. What is relevant is whether it appears
that Arbitrator M lacks impartiality with respect to Chubb’s and
Halliburton’s positions. For the reasons discussed above, there certainly is a
reasonable basis to conclude that there is an appearance of bias by
Arbitrator M regardless of whether that appearance reflects reality. The
appearance of impartiality is the foundation of a legitimate and fair dispute
resolution proceeding. Without the appearance of impartiality by the
decision maker, then the dispute resolution proceeding and result therein
will not be viewed as legitimate.
Finally, although the other Deepwater Horizon arbitrations purportedly
were going to be decided based upon different legal issues, Chubb denied
coverage to its other policyholder, Transocean, in one of those arbitrations
on some of the same grounds that it did in the Halliburton matter—the
settlements allegedly were unreasonable and entered without Chubb’s
61. Some of the earliest work in the area of unconscious bias can be traced to Anthony
Greenwald and Mahzarin Banaji. See generally Anthony Greenwald & Mahzarin Banaji, Implicit
Social Cognition: Attitudes, Self-Esteem, and Stereotypes, 102 PSYCHOL. REV. 4 (1995).
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consent.62 Consequently, it is irrefutable that some, if not many, of the facts
and legal issues in the various matters potentially were the same. Because
Bermuda Form English arbitration proceedings are confidential, however,
Halliburton would have no way of knowing what evidence was presented in
the other arbitration proceedings that might have impacted Arbitrator M’s
decision making with respect to Halliburton’s claim, and Halliburton had no
opportunity or ability to respond to that evidence. That is not fair and would
not be countenanced by U.S. courts.
V.

Conclusion

England’s Supreme Court has an opportunity to correct the lower
courts’ errors when they allowed Arbitrator M to be the neutral chair in the
Halliburton arbitration proceeding. Neutral arbitrators should not
simultaneously be party-appointed arbitrators in other proceedings that
involve some of the same parties and the same underlying matter. For the
past thirty years, American policyholders have been able to count on
English arbitrations to have a neutral and fair tribunal chair. If that will no
longer be the case, then there are several other cities, such as Singapore,
Zurich, Paris, or Toronto, that undoubtedly would be pleased to replace
London as the preeminent international arbitration center to resolve
insurance disputes.

62. Halliburton Co. v. Chubb Bermuda Ins. Ltd. [2017] EWHC (Comm) 137, [6] (Eng.).

